Opinion Are State-Owned Military Companies the Future?

[LeonardoBjj]

Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom
Monday, August 21, 2023, 2:00 PM

The aborted Wagner Group mutiny likely gives leaders around the world a reason to contemplate the risks of relying too heavily on PMCs.

State-owned enterprises can be found in almost every sector, from resource extraction to finance to transport. Privatization of state assets and services throughout the neoliberal era, especially following the Cold War, has spilled over to the military domain. As governments question the limits of privatization, however, private military companies (PMCs) could gradually and partially be replaced by state-owned military companies (SOMCs).

Are Private Military Companies Really Private?

PMCs, like any other industry, are heavily reliant on governmental support. One of the barriers to entry into the sector is the high cost of training personnel. Training a single recruit costs the U.S. Army anywhere from $55,000 to $74,000. This does not account for more specialized personnel, such as medics or pilots. In order to avoid this cost, PMCs tend to recruit experienced personnel, highlighting themselves as “veteran friendly.” As it stands, many security contractors benefit from a de facto military-to-PMC pipeline.

Recruitment of veterans is not limited to fellow citizens. Sometimes it is extended to foreign veterans as well. For example, Erik Prince, the notorious founder of the infamous mercenary company Blackwater, hired Colombian soldiers in a bid to train an Emirati security force. For Prince and his Emirati employers, Colombian contractors were seen as battle hardened from their time fighting Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerrillas (known as FARC) and are considerably cheaper than Western contractors. According to Sean McFate, a U.S. veteran turned mercenary:

When I was in the industry, I worked alongside other ex-special forces and ex-paratroopers from places like the Philippines, Colombia and Uganda. We did the same missions, but they got Third World wages. Private warriors are just like T-shirts; they are cheaper in developing countries. Call it the globalization of private force.

Regardless of where the contractors come from, their weapons are usually state sourced as well. Following years of denial, ChVK Vagner, better known as the Wagner Group, was acknowledged by Russian President Vladimir Putin as having received billions of dollars worth of funding and equipment from the Russian Federation. In the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Wagner’s owner Yevgeny Prigozhin repeatedly requested and received materiel from the Russian Ministry of Defense. Similarly, the mercenary group’s deployments elsewhere, such as in Mali and Syria, have been largely reliant on weapons being delivered to it. While weapons could be sourced from private hands, such an approach would represent a major logistical hurdle and be far harder with non-small arms equipment, like helicopters and heavy weapons.

The biggest factor behind a PMC’s ability to fight is money. Few entities aside from national governments can afford to employ a large number of mercenaries. In the case of China, foreign veterans have reportedly been involved in training its pilots while domestic private security contractors (PSCs)—which often employ former members of the People’s Liberation Army—have supported Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. By focusing on the developing world’s infrastructural needs, the Belt and Road Initiative has found itself in high-risk areas like Iraq and Pakistan, where Chinese nationals have been killed while working for Chinese state-owned enterprises. Meanwhile, even cash-strapped nations like the Central African Republic and Sudan are able to rely on their natural resources to fund the hiring of PMCs. Concurrently, wealthy and geopolitically energetic states like the United Arab Emirates are able to outcompete virtually any private employer in terms of pay.

Structurally, PMCs are often state trained, state equipped, and state employed. Their ownership stakes and dividend payouts are what make them private. Going forward, it is worth considering whether states will look to cut out the intermediaries who are pocketing the profits.

 

[LeonardoBjj]

Emerging SOMCs

The conflict in Ukraine hints at this potential change, as it has spurred a move toward SOMCs. The Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom is one such example. In early 2023, a Gazprom subsidiary (Gazpromneft) received authorization from Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin to form their own PSCs, which have been headed by former senior members of the Russian security services. Ostensibly, their purpose was to provide security for Gazprom’s facilities, but they have since been spotted in Ukraine, where they serve as volunteers instead of as conscripts.

Meanwhile, in the federal system that governs Russia, oblast and federal republics have also begun making their own inroads toward SOMCs. The most famous are the Chechen Kadyrovtsy, named after Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s father and predecessor, Akhmat Kadyrov. Like some other units, they straddle the line between the state and the private. They are a security force that is simultaneously under Ramzan Kadyrov’s command while still technically being a part of the National Guard of Russia; in June, they signed contracts directly with the Ministry of Defense. On July 25, the Russian parliament also voted to give governors the power to establish their own regional paramilitary companies when martial law is in effect or during a mobilization. According to Reuters, “[t]hese units would be funded and armed by the state and given the right to shoot down drones, fight enemy sabotage groups and conduct counter-terrorist operations.”

Potential Uses

Conflicts involving countries like the U.S., Russia, and the United Kingdom can often be described as interventions, such as a voluntary use of force in a foreign country. Conflicts like those in Iraq, Libya, and Syria bore witness to the deployment of foreign militaries in pursuit of perceived political or military necessities but were not existential in nature. In recent decades, however, public weariness has grown across the globe in reaction to such actions, which are often seen as military adventurism that is a drain on resources and personnel.

The risk of deployment along with reports of casualties of citizens can erode popular support for military action. Arguably the leading cause of anti-war sentiments in the U.S. during the Vietnam War was the risk of being drafted. Similarly, Russia’s partial mobilization in September 2022 resulted in large numbers of military-age males leaving the country. Military contractors, whether private or governmental, can help relieve some of this pressure. This is especially true if involved in conflicts not seen as vital for national security, including those that are far away from the country involved or are not regularly covered in the media. In these cases, a state-owned military company could serve as an expeditionary force, similar to the French Foreign Legion, which has frequently been employed in France’s former colonies.

While mercenaries are frequently conceived in the popular imagination as guns for hires in the midst of battles, the reality can be more mundane. Often, they provide security for either individuals or locations, acting more as guards than combatants. Continued instability in places like the Sahel, which has seen a wave of military coups in recent years, may inspire rulers elsewhere with tenuous grasps on power to rely on their own Praetorian Guards of sorts. The for-profit nature of PMCs and PSCs may be a cause for concern, leading some perhaps to prefer an SOMC, with its implied political backing.

The Cost-Benefit Analysis

Italian political philosopher and diplomat Niccolo Machiavelli warned rulers against the reliance on for-profit warriors, writing in “The Prince” that “[m]ercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies.” The aborted mutiny by the Wagner Group in June is likely to give leaders around the world, not just in the Kremlin, a reason to contemplate the risks of relying too heavily on PMCs.

SOMCs provide for the direct control of armed units, thereby minimizing the risk of mercenary revolts. A more thorough integration, while still serving a distinct expeditionary purpose from the rest of the armed forces, may provide political leaders a greater level of authority while retaining the flexibility inherent to PMCs. SOMCs can focus on more specialized missions, like counterinsurgency, search and rescue missions, and more, while the conventional forces can be reserved for more traditional military missions.

Coupled with a more clearly defined relationship with the state comes, potentially, improved legal protections and responsibilities. Whether it is in the military company’s home country or in the contracting state, the practices of state-owned enterprises or military-to-military relations are long established and much more clear than the quasi-private-state dynamic that currently exists. For many officials in Africa and Syria, the implications of the Wagner mutiny raised questions that a SOMC could help clarify by having an explicit bond with the state.

Despite this, a move from a PMC model to an SOMC one eliminates an advantage of the former, namely, ambiguity. Official denials by governments allow them to deploy PMCs at minimal costs. An overt admission of the link between a state and an armed unit, however, risks making the state liable for any potential negative consequences. The growing acknowledgement of the link between the Kremlin and the Wagner Group meant that, should Western states pursue a foreign terrorist organization designation against the latter, the former (along with other customers) could potentially be labeled and sanctioned as state sponsors of terror. Furthermore, such an escalation in rhetoric could also bring rival states closer to war.

Domestically, the creation of SOMCs could threaten the internal cohesion of the security services. The establishment of parallel institutions with similar profiles can often produce rivalries, such as between the Wehrmacht and the SS in the case of Nazi Germany or between the Islamic Republic of Iran Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. One challenge is the vying for power and influence among elites. However, far more practical problems can also emerge, such as competition for personnel. In the early 2000s, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated that it cost $15,000 to recruit a single soldier, a figure that is likely to have grown considerably. Since then, the U.S. military has faced chronic personnel shortages, missing its 2022 recruitment goal by 25 percent. Poaching by military companies, including state-owned ones, risks cannibalizing a country’s total military capacity.

SOMCs As Tools, Not Goals

Throughout history, major states have sought to project their power and influence abroad. The means to do so, however, have varied considerably, from using conventional forces to mercenary bands to proxies. Sometimes states rely on their own personnel, and other times states simply funnel weapons to the enemies of one’s enemies. As part of a vast and complex set of policies, SOMCs can be an additional asset at policymakers’ disposal.

https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/are-state-owned-military-companies-the-future

 

[LeonardoBjj]

The influence of Private Military Companies on global security​

The history of mercenary military activity goes back centuries, but modern-day Private Military Companies are a complex and controversial phenomenon in the global security landscape. Simone Rinaldi and Daniela Irrera argue that their role, and the implications of their use, raise significant challenges for the actors who employ them

Rapid, flexible, brutal​

Private Military Companies (PMCs) – organisations with military and security personnel – offer a range of military, paramilitary and security services to governments, the private sector, international organisations, and non-state actors.

PMCs are not new; traces of them date back to the Middle Ages. But these groups underwent significant growth during the latter half of the twentieth century. Throughout the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union used private military contractors for a variety of tasks, including logistics, infrastructure management, combat service support, consulting and, in some cases, covert operations.

In recent years, PMCs have evolved considerably. The US-based Blackwater (now Academi), and the South African Executive Outcomes, gained notoriety for their involvement in international conflicts. Often deployed in unstable contexts of asymmetric warfare, PMCs have been involved in security operations, military training, protection of critical infrastructure, and intelligence.

In some cases, as in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, PMCs have fulfilled tasks similar to those entrusted to regular forces. Their engagements, however, have not been without incidents of crime and brutality.

By employing private military companies, states can dissociate themselves from direct involvement in conflict, and maintain a non-partisan image among their electorate

There are many reasons why states and other global players use PMCs. They offer flexibility, rapid response, and specialist expertise. States can employ PMCs to perform sensitive or controversial tasks. This enables them to dissociate themselves from direct involvement, and to maintain a non-partisan image among their electorate. Another advantage is that PMCs reduce defence costs: there is no drain on state-owned personnel or equipment for protecting economically important infrastructure.

Wagner Group: an anomaly in the PMC landscape​

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/what-is-the-wagner-group-rcna90923

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine brought attention to the Wagner Group, a Russian PMC with anomalous characteristics. The Group has also been active in recent military operations in Sudan, Libya, Mali, and Syria. The main difference between Wagner and its predecessors is its huge volume of personnel. Wagner operates as a fully-fledged armed force, with land, sea, and air capabilities.

In Ukraine, Wagner is deployed in a conventional state-vs-state conflict. Essentially, it has become an independent spin-off of the Russian armed forces. Its actions stand in contrast with many Western PMCs, which are involved in post-conflict restoration, or low- to medium-intensity asymmetrical conflicts.

Wagner depends upon economic and military resources that overlap with Russian armed forces, yet it operates independently from them

Russia and the Wagner Group enjoy very close connections. Unlike other private companies, Wagner depends upon economic and military resources that overlap with Russian armed forces. In many cases, armoured vehicles or aircraft, and the personnel trained to operate them, move directly from Russian army or air force units into Wagner Group ranks.

The Kremlin’s extensive use of Wagner vehicles, equipment and personnel led to rapid expansion, to the point where Wagner now employs over 50,000 personnel. The true number, however, is difficult to estimate because of deployments on multiple fronts in the Ukraine conflict. To overcome their manpower shortage, Wagner opened up recruitment to former prisoners without military experience, thus strengthening its bargaining power with the Kremlin.

Wagner as a foreign policy tool​

The Kremlin frequently uses Wagner as its foreign policy instrument. Wagner operates independently from conventional forces, and spans a wide range of operations. The Group has become not simply a branch of the Russian military, but a legitimate international non-state actor. Wagner has its own strategic and political line, with elements of Soviet-era nostalgia, and extreme right-wing Russian ultranationalists who dare to defy orders from the Kremlin.

On 24 June 2023, Wagner forces, led by Evgenij Prigožin, rose up against Vladimir Putin. Their aim was to overthrow, or at least dictate, the political agenda of a global power. The Group's leadership used its political and military power, built up over many years, to oppose not only Putin's government but the Russian Defence Ministry. There is considerable overlap between Wagner forces and the Russian Defence Ministry. Indeed, Wagner's leadership has even sought to replace them.

Since the 24 June rebellion, Wagner has lost power, though it remains a non-state actor with its own potentially independent political clout

The governments of France, Estonia, Ukraine, Lithuania and the UK all designate Wagner a terrorist group. This is clear evidence of its high-profile international reputation and the political power it has acquired. Wagner has become a non-state actor with its own potentially independent political clout. As such, it can play a strategic role on the global military chessboard.

Wagner is also important in the way it erodes Russian national sovereignty. The events of 24 June, although still not fully accounted for, are unprecedented. Since the rebellion, Wagner appears to have lost power, and personnel. Despite the death of Prigožin, Wagner remains an international player, and an important PMC case study.

The growing presence of PMCs, and Wagner in particular, raises concerns about accountability, transparency, and respect for human rights. The regulatory and normative challenges associated with states' use of PMCs are the subject of fierce debate. The international community should pay urgent attention to them.

https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-influence-of-private-military-companies-on-global-security/

 

[Cole train]

Too expensive

Foreign legion stuff most likely becomes norm

Pay shit but promise person citizenship/visa or some other benefit and boom in guy go

 

[LeonardoBjj]

Wagner Group: What are private military companies?​

Oliver Pieper
06/28/2023June 28, 2023
So-called private military companies (PMCs) play an ever-greater role in military conflicts. But what are they? Here the most important questions and answers.

Wagner Group fighters are often called mercenaries — is that an accurate description?​

No. According to international humanitarian law, an individual must fulfill six criteria to be categorized as a mercenary. Article 47 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conference says, "A mercenary is any person who:

1) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;

2) Does, in fact, take a direct part in hostilities;

3) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party;

4) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;

5) Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and

6) Has not been sent by a state which is not party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.

These requirements are cumulative, which means that they must be applicable for an individual to be categorized as a mercenary."

Katharina Stein is a research assistant at the Institute for Public Law at the University of Freiburg in Germany and is currently writing her dissertation on the role of private militias in armed conflict. Stein tells DW: "A great many such private military contractors fail to fulfill those criteria. If you look at Syria for instance, you could describe it as an internationalized armed conflict in which Russia is involved. That means none of the Russians fighting there can be defined as mercenaries."

The most difficult criteria to fulfill, and not just for Wagner Group fighters but all potential mercenaries, is the third point, says Stein — namely, that of a substantially higher amount of compensation as compared with members of the national army.

Wagner fighters are not mercenaries by definition, but rather members of private military companies. Where did these get their start?​

Many Western countries privatized arms manufacturing after the end of World War II, the privatization of military services followed.

When the Cold War came to an end in 1990 and the United States, United Kingdom and the former Soviet Union began downsizing their armies, many well-trained soldiers were left without work. Those individuals found new homes at private military companies (PMCs) and were often contracted by those same countries to intervene in lower-intensity conflicts to allow the countries themselves from getting involved militarily.

"Sometimes private military contractors are companies embedded within other far larger business structures offering a number of services," Stein says. "We go in, free a hostage, and get out. Or we train the military."

What are the advantages of hiring private military companies?​

It is often a classic case of cost-effective outsourcing that attracts states to what appears to be an inexpensive alternative to a full-blown army.

"First of all they are far less expensive, because I don't have to train them. I don't have to pay for their retirement. I don't have to pay them when they get sick. I don't have to commit to paying them for 10 years, instead I just pay them to do one job — to get something done, say, in three months' time," says Stein, the international humanitarian law expert.

The US, for instance, invested some $300 billion (€275 billion) in 12 private militias between 1994 and 2007. That is an awfully large investment, nevertheless, a good one in the eyes of most countries. "Contractors are highly specialized, well-trained and bring their own equipment. I basically pay for what I get and have no further costs," Stein adds.

But above all, private military companies take care of the dirty work, much like the Wagner Group has been doing in Syria and Ukraine. Dead or injured contractors don't trigger the same domestic debates that dead soldiers do. And responsibility for, say war crimes, can be more easily brushed aside.

That is a central argument for Stein: "You can always say it wasn't us, break the direct chain of responsibility. PMCs can always be contracted if a parliament cannot be convinced to deploy an army."

Still, it is not always advantageous for the state to relinquish its monopoly on power, as was shown by Wagner troops marching through Russia toward Moscow last weekend — with a PMC mutinying against its own country for the first time.

Can private military companies be held criminally responsible for their actions?​

As a rule, PMCs are difficult for states to control as they often operate in murky legal waters and feel less obligated to uphold norms or conduct themselves according to international laws of war.

One of the best examples of such behavior was the 2007 massacre of 17 Iraqi civilians by fighters from the private US security company Blackwater in Baghdad. Four of the men responsible for carrying out the killings were pardoned by US President Donald Trump in 2020.

"The criminal prosecution of PMCs in the countries where they are deployed almost never happens. Over the past few decades, the only known criminal convictions stemmed from the failed 2004 coup d'état in Equatorial Guinea," says Stein. "Among others, Simon Mann, co-founder and CEO of Executive Outcomes and Sandline International, was sentenced to 34 years in prison, first in Zimbabwe and then Equatorial Guinea after he was extradited. He was pardoned by [Equatorial Guinea's] President Obiang in 2009."

The case drew attention above all because it involved Mark Thatcher, the son of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher had given Mann financial support and ultimately paid $590,000 to avoid going to prison.

Mathias Hues, everyone favorite bad-guy from the superior decade. The 90's.

Could Wagner start a new debate about private military companies?​

Stein said she hopes the case of the Wagner Group will force a fundamental shift in thinking about PMCs, and that pressure from society will lead to international regulations governing their deployment. To date, however, any attempts to do so have failed. "There have been several international attempts to create binding contracts for PMCs at the UN level. But these were all blocked, mostly by the US, the UK, South Africa and Israel. Those are the four states that use PMCs most."

Many states like to point to the so-called Montreaux Document passed on September 17, 2008, when it comes to such initiatives. It is the first-ever internationally developed paper — created with the participation of Germany, Ukraine and the US — to define basic rules regulating how states deal with private military and security companies (PMSCs).

Yet Stein says the document, which seeks to uphold international humanitarian law and human rights, has one major flaw: "It is widely celebrated because it claims to provide some type of regulation. But it is non-binding. It is repeatedly emphasized that no rights or obligations can be inferred from the document. The Montreaux Document is simply about appearances."

Border line
Dead inside
I don't mind
Falling to pieces
Count me in, violent
Let's begin feeding the sickness
How do I simplify?
Dislocate the enemy's on the way
Show me what it's like
To dream in black and white
So I can leave this world tonight
Full of fear
Ever clear
I'll be here fighting forever
Curious, venomous
You'll find me
Climbing to heaven
Never mind turn back time
You'll be fine
I will get left behind




https://www.dw.com/en/wagner-group-what-are-private-military-companies/a-66062061

 

[LeonardoBjj]

Too expensive

Foreign legion stuff most likely becomes norm

Pay shit but promise person citizenship/visa or some other benefit and boom in guy go

- The Foreign Legion is a good payment for us in Brazil, with the advantege that they only pay a percentage of the salary, the rest is only when the years of contract is up.

 

[LeonardoBjj]

Former rebels in Central African Republic disarm but face few options. Wagner is one of them​

BY SAM MEDNICK
Updated 4:54 AM BRT, April 3, 2024

BOUAR, Central African Republic (AP) — The bodies of children killed in the crossfire lay on the ground. It was too much for the rebel. After a year of fighting rivals across Central African Republic, the abuses were mounting and he wanted out.

The 42-year-old took advantage of a nationwide program meant to help people like him lay down their guns. He trained in entrepreneurship, received a bi-weekly stipend of about $35 and was told to return to civilian life.

But there’s little normal life for veteran fighters in one of the world’s most volatile countries. He couldn’t find work, was shunned by his family for his violent past and was threatened by enemies. Two years later he became a fighter again, this time helping Russian mercenaries combat the armed groups he had left.

Nearly 5,000 fighters have put down their arms in Central African Republic since the program launched nearly a decade ago. Yet former rebels, communities and conflict experts say it’s hard to stop fighting in a country where little other paid work exists.

Central African Republic has been in conflict since 2013, when predominantly Muslim rebels seized power and forced the president from office. Mostly Christian militias fought back. A 2019 peace deal only lessened the fighting, and six of the 14 armed groups that signed later left the agreement.

Another armed presence is Wagner, the Russian mercenary group tasked with protecting the presidency and securing the country. Its fighters have been accused by rights groups and civilians of recruiting a local militia to help it fight rebels while committing abuses and exploiting Central African Republic’s rich mines and forests.

Some of those militia members went through the national program to disarm.

The Associated Press spoke with four fighters in the western city of Bouar and the capital, Bangui, who went through the program. One is the 42-year-old who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals.

Central African Republic’s government estimates that up to 15% of those who go through the disarmament program return to armed groups. It is not clear if that includes Wagner. The United Nations, which piloted and supports the program, has said it loses track of about 70% of people who participate.

Experts call the program shortsighted, with combatants given few viable options beyond fighting. Nearly 70% of people in Central African Republic live in extreme poverty, according to the World Bank.

Former fighters are recruited by Wagner or return to communities that are marginalized or attacked by security forces and Wagner allies, “which can easily cause them to take up arms again,” said University of Montreal researcher Alexandra Lamarche.

Neither option will lead to lasting peace, she said.

The disarmament program began in 2015 as a pilot initiative by the U.N. peacekeeping mission. Three years later, it expanded and the government took over.

The program encourages fighters to lay down their arms and dissuades potential recruits. To join, fighters must hand in a gun or several hundred cartridges of ammunition. They are given the choice of joining the security forces or doing vocational training.

But former combatants say the training isn’t long enough to learn a skill, and the army doesn’t take everyone.

Anatol Clement Bannem, the U.N. peacekeeping mission’s program coordinator in Bouar, said many fighters who leave armed groups wait for months to enter the program. He has 10 waiting.

“I have weapons here that have been given to me some three months ago, and yet the people do not know where they are going,” Bannem said.

Conflict hurts the program’s consistency, said Jules Gautier Ngbapo, its communications officer. In Bouar, the program stopped six months after it began in 2017 because rebel leaders objected, and it restarted only after the peace deal.

Boundaries between armed groups can be fluid. A report last year by the investigative group the Sentry found that some militia members fighting alongside Wagner had been formally integrated into the military, while others had not. A U.N. report in 2022 said the national defense forces recruited some fighters and used them as proxies.

International Crisis Group researcher Charles Bouessel said has has spoken with several rebels who went through the disarmament program and then were recruited by Wagner and the government in Bangui and the Ouaka region.

“This raises the question of the purpose and credibility of government disarmament programs,” Bouessel said. He warned the practice could fuel tensions, and allied armed groups could turn against the government.

The government says only former combatants who have officially reintegrated into the army work with Wagner. “We don’t work with militia ... It’s the national army that recruits and gives (people) to Wagner. Then Wagner can choose among the soldiers,” said Fidele Gouandjika, special advisor to the president.

But the former fighter now working with Wagner said he never went through military training after the disarmament program. He asserted that the government quietly pays him about $130 a month to help Wagner locate mines to exploit and collect information about rebels, without giving evidence.

“(The Russians) wanted me to work with them since I had fought as a rebel,” he said.

The Russian government did not respond to a request for comment. The special adviser to the president denied his account was true.

The World Bank, which has invested about $30 million in the program since 2017 and has committed $90 million more until 2028, said it is aware of such allegations but that its funding goes through international partners, not the government.

A U.S. State Department spokesperson said the U.S. has given more than $3.5 million to the program since 2016 but the money will end this year, calling it a step toward the government’s ownership of the process.

The U.S. spokesperson said they were familiar with reports that Wagner recruits from among armed groups to partner with “and consider them credible.”

Former fighters who haven’t returned to conflict say they struggle.

Sitting beside an idle sewing machine that she received in training, Carole said she doesn’t feel comfortable making clothes, afraid she’ll make a mistake after receiving little instruction. She gave only her first name out of fear of reprisals.

The 32-year-old joined rebels in 2013 after other fighters attacked Bouar, killing her mother and father. She worked as a cook but escaped after watching fellow rebels decapitate two rivals.

Now she works in the market, barely supporting her three children. She worries her 15-year-old son might be recruited to fight by armed groups operating about 30 miles (50 kilometers) from town.

“The threat is the lack of jobs and poverty. Some people wake up and only have coffee all day,” said Lazare Ouango, a local chief who said he spent months going door-to-door to explain the importance of acceptance for former combatants. Many traumatized residents didn’t trust fighters to return peacefully.

Wilson Koudinguere hung his head as he listed some of the civilians he killed during his years with armed groups. “We did so many bad things,” he said.

Lifting his shirt, he pointed to a scar where he said his commander shot him when he first tried to leave. He finally left in 2018 and trained with the army. But he wasn’t recruited.

https://apnews.com/article/central-...armed-groups-302d633a15b8c91bfe63143dc40f4200

 

[LeonardoBjj]

Russian military trainers arrive in Niger as relations deteriorate with the US​

BY JESSICA DONATI
Updated 7:54 PM BRT, April 12, 2024

DAKAR, Senegal (AP) — Russian military trainers arrived this week in Niger to reinforce the country’s air defenses as the west African nation pulls away from close cooperation with the United States in counterterrorism efforts, turning instead to Russia for security.

State television in Niger on Thursday broadcast footage of Russian military trainers arriving in the country aboard a plane equipped with military supplies. Two Russian trainers were filmed in front of the plane at night wearing military uniforms, caps and face coverings.

“We are here to train the Nigerien army to use the military equipment that is here,” one of the Russian trainers said in the broadcast, speaking in French. “We are here to develop military cooperation between Russia and Niger.”

Niger’s ruling military council, known as the CNSP, has yet to order American troops out, U.S. officials have said. But the arrival of Russian forces makes it complicated for the U.S. forces, along with diplomatic and civilian personnel, to remain in the country. It also throws into doubt the future of joint Niger-U.S. counterinsurgency operations.

Until recently, Washington considered Niger a key partner and ally in a region swept by coups in recent years, investing millions of dollars in an airbase in a desert area that served as the heart of American counterinsurgency operations in Africa’s sub-Saharan region known as the Sahel.

The U.S. also invested heavily in training Niger’s forces to beat back insurgencies by militants linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State group, which ravaged the country and its neighbors. But last summer, some of those elite U.S.-trained forces took part in a coup that ousted the elected president. Since then, relations between Niger’s new leaders and Washington have deteriorated.

Following the visit last month of a U.S. delegation led by the top U.S. envoy to Africa, Molly Phee, the junta announced on state television that flights from the U.S.-built airbase were illegal and that it no longer recognized the American military presence in the country.

The junta criticized the U.S. for warning Niger against cooperating with Russia and Iran, saying it was trying to force the African nation to choose between partners.

A senior U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing talks, said Washington was looking at options for revising military cooperation with Niger. While the path forward would not be easy, there was still hope for finding a formula that addressed concerns and interests on both sides, the official said.

The Russian plane had arrived on Wednesday night, the report by Niger’s state television said, and carried Russian military supplies to help Niger improve its air defenses. The broadcast said the arrival of Russian trainers followed a call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Niger’s military leaders in March. Niger’s military leaders are seeking to diversify their partnerships and achieve greater sovereignty, the broadcast said.

“The arrival of a Russian air defense system can be viewed as part of the junta’s effort to reclaim sovereignty, this time over its airspace, and force the U.S. and Russia to cooperate with each other in Niger,” said John Lechner, Africa analyst and author on the Wagner Group. But he added that, “Such cooperation is unlikely.”

He said the Niger government may be trying to compel the U.S. forces to withdraw without explicitly pushing them out.

Since 2012, Niger and other neighbors in the region have been gripped by a worsening insurgency fought by groups linked to al-Qaida and Islamic State militants.

As recently as December, some 600 U.S. troops and hundreds more contractors were stationed in Niger, tasked with flying manned and unmanned surveillance operations and supporting local forces against jihadi groups.

https://apnews.com/article/niger-russia-military-trainers-18d6435d00e7790de9ee53e24bfca7ba